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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE PRESIDENT'S LOYALTY ORDERSTANDARDS, PROCEDURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL AsPECTs-In the most
recent of the e:fforts of the last several years to protect the ranks of
officers and employees of the federal government from infiltration by
foreign agents and persons whose interests are inimical to those of the
United States, President Truman, on March 21, 1947, issued his
"Loyalty Order." 1 The first item in the pattern of statutes, orders, and
regulations which supplies the background for the controversial Order
No. 9835 was the Hatch Act of 1939,2 by which Congress prohibited
federal employees from membership in organizations advocating the
overthrow of the constitutional form of government. One year later,
an addition to the Civil Service Act conferred on the War and Navy
Departments the power to remove from the classified civil service anyone guilty of conduct opposed to public interest in the defense program,8
and this was followed in l 941 by the initiation of the now routine
Congressional practice of attaching to appropriations bills, provisos
that no funds should be paid to anyone advocating the overthrow of the
government by force.4 Under the authority of two preceding Executive
Orders, the Civil Service Commission, in March, 1942, issued its War
51 ln re Epstein, (D.C. Pa. 1913) 206 F. 568, affd., Epstein v. Steinfeld, (C.C.A.
3d, 1914) 210 F. 236, quoted by Chief Justice Taft in the Oriel case, 278 U.S. 358
at 366.
52 One facet of that hardship may be deduced from the fact that bankruptcy no
longer carries the social stigma that imprisonment does. See Radin, "Debt," 5 ENcYc.
Soc. Sc1. 2 at 38 (1931).
53 The easiest way out, of course, is to apply the presumption of continued possession and the contempt committal only to those who are guilty and who .still have the
goods.
1 Executive Order No. 9835, March 25, 1947, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (1947).
The order has been implemented by a Congressional appropriation of $n,ooo,ooo for
its enforcement. P.L. 299, 80th Cong., 1st sess., c. 414 (H.R. 4347) (July 31, 1947).
2 53 Stat. L. n48 (1939), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 61(i).
3 54 Stat. L. 713 (1940), 5 U.S.C. (1940) § 653.
4 But where the statute named the employees to whom payment was to be denied,
the-Supreme Court held it invalid as a b,ill of attainder. 57 Stat. L. 43 l at 450 (1943);
· United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946).
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Service Regulations, denying examination or appointment in the classified civil service, if there were a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of
the individual to the United States.5 To implement further these
statutes and regulations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was
authorized to investigate federal employees who were members of
subversive organizations or who allegedly advocated the overthrow
of the federal government by force. 6 No consideration of the background of the order would be complete without including the work of
the House Un-American Activities Committee, which from its inception in 1938 has exerted a substantial force in the direction of antisubversive measures. 1 The last measure·in the overture to Order No.
9835 came late in 1946 with the establishment of the President's
Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, to investigate and determine whether security provisions in the executive branch afforded
ad~quate protection against disloyal and subversive persons, and to
recommend procedures and standards for judging the loyalty of employees and applicants. 8 Acting upon the report of this commission,9
the President issued his Order, Prescribing Procedures for the Administration of an Employee Loyalty Program in the Executive Branch
of the Government.

r. The Program: Its Scope, Procedure, and Aims
The Order, on its face, applies to all civilian employees of the executive branch. 10 At present there are approximately 2,000,000 individuals within the scope of the program,11 excluding employees of the
5

F.R. Doc. 42-9671, § 18.2(c)(7), 7 FED. REG. 7723 (Sept., 1942); The
upholding of this regulation by the federal courts supplies strong precedent for the
validity of Order 9835. Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. App. 1946) 159 F. (2d)
22, cert. den., 330 U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 979 (1947). As a result of the wartime investigations by the Civil Service Commission, of 395,000 federal employees investigated,
1300 were removed because of a reasonable ground for believing them disloyal.
Of these, about 700 were in the Communist category. Wechsler, "How to Rid the
Government of Communists," HARPER'S MAGAZINE 438 (November, 1947).
6
55 Stat. L. 265 at 292 (1941); 56 Stat. L. 468 at 482 (1942); United States v.
Marzani, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 615. The investigative power of the bureau
has been defined further by statutes creating particularly sensitive agencies which
provide for investigation of all personnel prior to employment. See, for instance, the
U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, P.L. 402, 80th Cong., 2d
sess. (H.R. 3342) (Jan. 2% 1948).
1
For a discussion of the history of the committee and the constitutionality of its
investigations, see 14 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 256 (1947) and 46 MicH. L. REv. 521
(1948).
8 Executive Order No. 9806, Nov. 25, 1946, II FED. REG. 13863 (1946).
9
See, Report of President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty (1947).
10
Exec. Order No. 9835, Part I, § 1, 12 FED. REG. 1935 (March, 1947).
11
Statement by Seth W. Richardson, chairman of the Loyalty Review Board
of the Civil Service Commission; N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 28:2.
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State, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments, and of the Atomic
Energy Commission.12
Each employee or apl?licant for employment in a department or
agency included in the program is checked initially by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The investigative assistance of the bureau is
regarded as essential because of its facilities and able personnel. If any
"derogatory matter" is disclosed by the preliminary reports ·of its
agents, the bureau is obliged to make a complete investigation of the
individual's record. The results of this inquiry are forwarded to the
proper department or agency in the case of an employee, or to a regional office of the Civil Service Commission in the case of an applicant. There, a primary hearing on the question of disloyalty is held
before a board appointed by the head of the department or by the commission, as the case may be. The report of the bureau is not binding on
the board, and if it finds no reasonable basis for questioning the loyalty
of the investigated party, the matter is closed. Up to this point, all the
proceedings are secret and are probably unknown even to the employee
or applicant. If the loyalty board decides that there are derogatory
facts requiring explanation, it prepares a statement of charges, setting
forth the facts on which the question of disloyalty depends. The discretion of the board governs the specificity with which the charges are
stated.18 After being served with this statement the employee is entitled to a hearing before the board, at which he may be assisted by
counsel and may introduce evidence. The hearing is private, and the
proceedings are transcribed. The employee is not allowed to see the
12

Statement by President Truman in the N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1947, p. 1:6. 56
Stat. L. 1053, § 3 (1942), 5 U.S.C. (Supp. "\'.", 1946) 562, note, withdraws employees of the War and Navy Departments from the operation of the Civil Service
Act [37 Stat. L. 555, 5 U.S.C. (1940) § 652] and allows the secretary to remove anyone
whose dismissal he deems warranted by the demands of national security. 60 Stat. L. 7 5 3,
§ IZ(4) confers similar power on the Atomic Energy Commission. Under the McCarran Amendment t6 the Department of State Appropriation Act of 1947 [60 Stat. L.
446 at 458 (1946) ], the secretary may terminate the employment of any officer or
employee of the State Department if he deems it advisable in the interests of the
United States. It is· specified that such termination does not affect the right of persons
removed to accept employment in other government departments. A similar provision
was contained in the Department of State Appropriation Act of l 948, omitting, however, any reference to reemployment in other departments. P.L. 166, 80th Cong.,
1st sess., c. 2II, p. 12 (H.R. 3311) (1947). The Loyalty Review Board of the
Civil Service Commission refused to assume jurisdiction in the case of ten State
Department employees dismissed under the McCarran Amendment, although the
department indicated a desire to be included within the President's program. N. Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1947, p. l :6: As a substitute, i:he Department has promulgated its
own Security Principles, establishing standards .and procedure for removals. N. Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1947, p. 1:6 at 8:4.
13
Exec. Order No. 9835, Part II, § 2b, 12 FED. REG. 1935 at 1937 (March,
1947).
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report of the bureau, however, nor can he confront and cross-examine
his accuser.14 It is argued that without this prohibition it is impossible
for the program to have the benefit of skilled investigations, because
the bureau obtains ·its information from confidential quarters, closely
connected with national security.15
If the conclusion of the loyalty board is unfavorable to the employee, the order provides the right of appeal to the head of the
department or agency, with a further right of appeal to the eighteenman Loyalty Review Board of the Civil Service Commission. Under
the terms of the order, the review board is also charged with the overall administration of the program. The procedure here presented has
been developed by that board from the outline sketched in the President's Order.
The aim of the program is the elimination of disloyal officers and
employees from government employment. To this end, the order requires for a determination of disloyalty, a finding that " . . . on all
the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal." 16 Six activities are specified which may be considered in making this determination.17
"a. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor,
or knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs;
"b. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof;
"c. Advocacy of revolution or force or violence to alter the
constitutional form of government of the United States;
"d. Inte~tional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under
circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States,
. of documents or information of a confidential or non-public char- 1
acter, obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of
his employment by the Government of the United States.
"e. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in
preference to the interests of the United States.
"f. Membership in, affiliation with, or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization ... designated by
the attorney general as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted q. policy of advocating or approving
the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons
their rights under the Constitution of the United States by unconstitutional means."
Part IV, § 2, id. at 1938.
.
Mr. Richardson, in the N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 28:2.
16
Part V, § 1, 12 FED. REG. 1935 at 1938 (March, 1947).
17 Part V, § 2, ibid.
14

15
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In connection with the last of these, the Department of Justice is required to furnish the Loyalty Review Board with the name of each
foreign and domestic organization ". . . which the attorney general,
after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy
of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence
to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United
States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United
States by unconstitutional means." 18 The first four of the activities
mentioned surely would be adequate indications of disloyalty.19 To the
fifth, the chief objection is its vaguei;iess. But it is the sixth for which
the most severe criticism is reserved. It is argued that to establish
a standard such as this invites a political "inquisition," "· .. so extensive as to create a probability of the large scale establishment of political police." 20 On the other hand, we have the assurance of the
review board that the program will not degenerate into a "witch
hunt," and that mere membership in an organization branded as subversive by the Department of Justice will not suffice for a finding of
disloyalty, but· will be only one piece in the "mosaic of evidence." 21
That the ultimate aims of the Order are legitimate and probably
vital, is a view which almost all would share. From the response which
it has evoked there would appear to be an equally widespread belief that
the program is unsatisfactory in its present form. 22 One of the arguments which has been put forward in defense of the program rests on
the avoidance through this action by the President of much more
stringent action by Congress.28 But if it were to be done, the enactPart III, § 3, ibid.
They are, in fact, punishable as crimes under the U.S. Criminal Code: 35
Stat. L. 1088 (1909), 18 U.S.C. (1940) §§ 1, 5; 35 Stat. L. 1089 (1909), 18
U.S.C. (1940) § 6; 4o_Stat. L. 230 (1917), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 98; 54 Stat. L.
671 (1940), 18 U.S.C. (1940) § 10; 53 Stat. L. 1148 (1939), 18 U.S.C. (1940)
§ 61(i).
20
"The Constitutional Right to Advocate Political, Social, and Economic
Change--An Essential of American Democracy," 7 LAWYERS GUILD REv. 57 (1947).
The authors also submit ·that the excessive authority vested in the attorney general
makes him in effect a political censor. It is suggested that since designation by him
apparently makes past membership in a subversive organization evidence of disloyalty,
the penalty of removal may be regarded as an ex post facto law.
21
Mr. Richardson, in the N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1947, p. 28:2 at 28:6.
22
For example, see the treatment of the question in 47 _CoL. L. REV. 1161
(1948).
23
Much legislation on this subject has been proposed recently. The argument
that the Pr~sident's Order forestalls stricter measures by Congress would appear to have
been refuted by the recent refusal of the House Un-American Activities Committee
to accept a finding by the loyalty board of the Commerce Department that one of its
officers was not disloyal. The demand by Chairman Thomas for the files of the board
18

19
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ment of well considered legislation, limited to the more positive manifestations of disloyalty and the more strategic agencies of the government, would be a step toward the solution of the present difficulties: 24
One of the ablest discussions of the entire program criticizes the President's order for its failure to distinguish mere non-conformists from
the participants in foreign-born conspiracies, or to differentiate between
communism as an idea and communist parties as agencies of Soviet
espionage. 25 The difficulty of making this distinction, however, may
present us with the dilemma of electing a liberal policy with the risk
of overlooking some individuals of the conspiratorial stripe or of following the path on which we now move at the risk of eliminating those
who are merely non-conformists. The task of balancing such significant
interests as these would seem to be one which should be exercised by
the legislature.
2. Constitutional Aspects
The President's Order, whether issued under the basic responsibility for the execution of the laws imposed on him by the Constitution, 26 or the delegations of power by Congress contained in the Civil
Service Act,27 is an executive act, and as such may well be immune to
judicial review. Any assault on Order No. 9835 will be met at the
outset by this reluctance of the courts to interfere with the exercise of
executive power, or to substitute their judgment for that of the executive officer causing the removal. 28 The underlying theory seems to be
that where neither Constitution nor statute limits tenure or prescribes
the standards for removal, it may be assumed that it was not intended
that the appointee hold office for life. From this, it follows that the
appointing officer must have the discretionary power of removal. 29
Where, however, Congress has established such criteria for removal
presaged a conflict between Congress and the executive branch which seems to indicate another weakness of the present program. N.Y. TIMES, March 3, 1948, p. 1:2, et
seq.
24
c;ompare the federal program to that recently initiated by the British government. Removals are apparently limited to Communists employed in the departments
where security is most important, and an effort is made to find the discharged employee
a job in some less vulnerable part of the government. 51 TIME 40 (March 29, 1948).
25
Wechsler, "How to Rid the Government of Communists," HARPER'S MAGAZINE 438 (November, 1947).
26 Art. 2, § 3.
27
Rev. Stat. 1753 (1878), 5 U.S.C. (1940) § 631; 22 Stat. L. 403 (1883), 5
u.s.c. (1940) § 632.
28
Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 17 S.Ct. 880 (1897); Keim v. United
States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574 (1900); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419,
21 S.Ct. 842 (1901); Eberlein v. United States, 257 U.S. 82, 42 S.Ct. 12 (1921);
Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 40 S.Ct. 374 (1920).
29
Matter of Hennen, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 230 at 259 (1839).
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as it does by the Civil Service Acts,so the courts will interfere to assure
the employee of notice and hearing in the determination of those
causes.81 Since there is no constitutional right against the discretionary
acts of the appointing officer, the courts are merely carrying out the
expression or implication of the statute.82 If a standard is set up, there
must be some procedure for determining whether that standard has
been met. Proceeding, however, from this basic assumption that the
power of removal is discretionary, at least within the area allowed by
statute, it may be consistent that the procedure followed is not circumscribed by the requirements of procedural due process 88 nor by any
other constitutional provision.
Although compliance with the statutory procedure will be insisted
upon, findings of fact by the executive officer in these removal cases
have always been ·treated as conclusive.84 It may be conceded that a government employee has no property right in his position, and therefore
has no right to appeal to the courts when that is all that is denied to
him.85 But if the,removal is used to implement the denial of a right
guaranteed by the Constitution against deprivation by federal action,
it would seem to come within the jurisdiction of the courts. This may
appear inconsistent with the idea of executive discretion, but the argument is predicated on the theory that the discretion is not absolute. It
so 37 Stat, L. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. (1940) § 652. Removals from the classified civil service are allowed only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service.
31 Barak v. Biddle, (App. D.C. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 278, cert. den., 323 U.S.
738, 65 S.Ct. 42 (1944); Walker v. Popenoe, (App. D.C. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 511.
82
United States ex rel. Brown v. Lane, 232 U.S. 598, 34 S.Ct. 449 (1914);
where the statute, although providing grounds for removal, was interpreted as requireing neither notice nor hearing, it was held that relater was entitled to neither under
the Fifth Amendment.
88
The provisions of the Civil Service Act in this respect would not seem to measure
up to the standards of the Fifth Amen'dment, since they require " ••• no examination
of witnesses nor any trial or hearing ••• except in the discretion of the officer making
the removal." 37 Stat. L. 555 (1912), 5 U.S.C. (1940) § 652. It will be noted·by
comparison that the order establishes a hearing as a matter of right. It must also be
remembered that a large number of federal employees are not included in the classified civil service and therefore have not even the protection afforded by the Civil
Service Act. In Dec., 1940, 26.6 per cent of the executive civil service was unclassified.
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL.CIVIL SERVICE, United States Civil Service Commission
(1941).
'
84
Levine v. Farley, (App. D.C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 186, cert. den., 308 U.S.
622, 60 S.Ct. 377 (1940); Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (App. D.C. 1946) 159 F.
(2d) 22, cert. den., 330 U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 979 (1947); Asher v. Forrestal, (D.C.
D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 470.
85
Crenshaw v. United State,s, 134 U.S. 99 at 108, IO S.Ct. 431 (1890); Taylor
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 at 577, 20 S.Ct. 890 (1900); Dodge v. Board of Education,
302 U.S. 74, 58 S.Ct. 98 (1937); 99 A.L.R. 336 at 341 (1935).
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is confined to cases where removal is actually based upon the efficient
operation of the department or agency, and within that area it seems
proper that the courts should not intervene except to enforce the statutory procedure. When removal, although motivated by the desire to
promote the welfare of the agency, is based upon factors which lie
outside the scope of employment activity, it may be that the act of
removal is not exclusively an executive function. 80 The problem may
be analogized to that of the Congressional power of investigation. So
long as it is exercised to assist in the legislative process, it is not within
the purview of the courts. But it is within the judicial province to prevent these investigations from becoming mere "fishing expeditions"
having no legislative purpose, and therefore lying without the scope
of that branch of the government. 87 It seems well established that one
may be denied his liberty if he is punished for exercising it.88 May not
removal from office come within this punishment categqry when it is
based upon the exercise by the employee of a constitutional right?
Applying these principles to the President's "Loyalty Order," if
the employee is to have his freedom of thought and association protected against action by his superiors, and if the Court properly may
assume jurisdiction over removals in this extra-managerial area, should
not the loyalty program be required to measure up to the established
tests of substantive due process? 39 The most vulnerable point of the
Order in this respect is the indefiniteness of the standards which it sets
up for determining disloyalty. Such vagueness in itself has been held
sufficient to deny due process.40 It is true that this requirement of
86
The Constitution expressly prohibits discrimination in giving employment in
the federal government on account of religion (Art. VI). May not this set the pattern
for constitutional protection against discrimination on account of an exercise of the
general freedom of thought and association?
87
See 46 M1cH. L. REv. 521 (1948).
38
Bomar v. Keyes, (C.C.A. 2d, 1947) 162 F. (2d) 136 at 139, cert. den.,
(U.S. 1947) 68 S.Ct. 166;1 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct.
877 (1943). In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946), the involuntary separation from, federal employment was recognized as penal, in view of
the stigma which it cast and the curtailment of the ability to earn a livelihood which
it caused.
89
Since the first amendment refers specifically to action by Congress, primary
reliance must be placed upon the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment as the
protector of the personal right to free speech and association against deprivation except
where it is necessary to prevent grl\ve public danger. Justice Murphy, concurring, in
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 at 163, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945). See also, Justice
Black's dissent in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 114,
67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). Although he was speaking there of rights guaranteed by the
first amendment, his language is applicable to the problem of governmental interference in general.
40
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921);
Connally v. Gen. Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126 (1926); Lanzetta v. New
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definiteness is customarily associated with criminal statutes, but these
disloyalty proceedings, although technically non-criminal in nature,
cannot be regarded as ordinary civil actions, and may result in sanctions of greater impact than the imposition of a criminal sentence.41
When these standards impinge upon the employee's liberty, they may
also be subjected to the "clear and present" danger test, so often voiced
by the Court where such rights are involved.42 Disloyalty itself
probably does present a clear and present danger of frustration of
the government's activities, disclosure of its secrets, and exposure of its
members to foreign propaganda. But it is another question whether
one who is associated with " ... a domestic organization designated by
the attorney general as ..• subversive," 43 can be said to represent such
a menace. Some idea of the Court's reaction to these arguments can be
had from the recent decision upholding the provision of the Hatch Act
prohibiting political activity by federal employees.44 The Court apparently gave no consideration to the "clear and present danger" test,
applying only the somewhat vague standard, that such regulations
must not pass " •.• beyond the general existing conception of governmental power," as developed from " ... practice, history, and changing
educational, social and economic conditions." 45
.
Having assumed the answer to the major problem by the proposition that these extra-managerial removals must measure up to the
requirements of the Fifth Amendment, it should follow that the standards of-procedural du_e process must also be met, not merely in the
narrow sense that the established procedure must be followed, but in
the broader purport that this established procedure must conform to
some superior concept of a fair hearing. This opens up the second
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618 (1939); Aigler, "Legislation in Vague or General
Terms," 21 M1cH. L. REV. 831 (1923).
41
The disloyalty proceeding may at least be compared to a denaturalization suit,
which the Supreme Court has treated as something akin to a criminal action. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 at 160, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943), or to a deportation proceeding, where the comparison to a criminal action was made in a concurring
opinion by Justice Murphy; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 at 163, 65 S.Ct. 1443
(1945).
42
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 3rn U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65
S.Ct. 315 (1945).
48
Exec. Order.No. 9835, Part V, § 2, 12 FED. REG. 1935 at 1938 (March,
1947).
44
53 Stat. L. 1148 (1939), 18 U.S.C (1940) § 61(h). United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). See also, Mosher, "Government
Employees Under the Hatch Act," 22 N.Y. UNiv. L.Q. 233 (1947).
45
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at rn2, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).
Three of the seven justices who heard the case, in• two vigorous dissenting opinions,
attacked the validity of the act.
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questionable portion of the President's Order. The accused is to have
no opportunity to confront or cross-examine those who testify against
him.~ Neither is it required that the employee be informed specifically
of the charges against him. 47 Quite apart from the possible expediency
of these provisions, a strong argument can be made that this is a denial
of the fair hearing guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.48 The fact
that removals will be supervised by high-minded individuals who have
pledged that the investigations shall not degenerate into a "witch
hunt" should not alter the picture; it would not seem that the requirements of due process can be compromised by the assurances of individuals, whatever their integrity.49

3. Conclusion
It appears somewhat doubtful that the Order will ever be passed
on by the Supreme Court. Precedent indicates that the Court may find
no question appropriate for judicial review. 50 And even if this barrier
is overcome, the decision undef the Hatch Act seems to establish that
the Court is willing to allow a free reign in these matters. 51
Admitting the likelihood of the program's legality, it is still open
to question on the general ground of wise governmental policy. The
impression of the widespread effect, of the program should not be
diminished by the fact that in only a very few cases will actual dismissal result.5 2 The consequences of so detailed and personal an investi48 Exec. Order No. 9806, Part IV, § 2, 12 FED. REG. 1935 at 1938 (March,
1947); the investigative agency may refuse to disclose the names of confidential informants, if it is"••. essential to the protection of the informants or to the investigation of
other cases."
47
Part II, § 2b, id. at 1937; charges need to be stated only as " •.. specifically
and completely as, in the discretion of the employing department or agency, security
conditions permit. • • ."
48
"A fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses can not be proved
against an accused ••• except by witnesses who confront him at the trial .•• whom he is
entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach. • • ." Kirby v.
United States, 174 U.S. 47 at 55, 19 S.Ct. 574 (1899); Motes v. United States, 178
U.S. 458, 20 S.Ct. 993 (1900); RorncHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw 831 (1939).
In a number of cases, orders of administrative tribunals have been set aside because the
material on which they were based was not introduced satisfactorily as evidence at the
hearing. United States v. Abilene & So. R. Co., 265 U.S. 274 at 289, 44 S.Ct. 565
(1924); Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773 (1938).
49
RorncHAEFER, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 841 (1939). See also the dissenting
opinion in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 at 160, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945).
60
Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (App. D.C. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22, cert. den.,
330 U.S. 838, 67 S.Ct. 979 (1947), supra, note 5.
51
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947),
supra, notes 44 and 45. In general, on the subject of constitutional limitations on
political discrimination in public employment, see 60 HARV. L. REv. 779 (1947).
52
Of nearly 420,000 federal employees examined up to March 1, 1948, only
399 were found to'warrant further investigation. Of these, 66 were cleared and 25
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gation cannot be measured by the number of removals which it occasions. By far the more significant results are the loss of reputation and
the imputation of disloyalty to which the employee is exposed by the
mere fact of his investigation, with the attendant effect of discouraging
able men from entering government service.53 The serious implications of allowing "guilt by association" with a group denominated as
subversive by the attorney general, and of denying to the accused any
opportunity of confrontation or cross-examination are pointed up eloquently in a recent statement by a group of prominent legal educators.54
William j_ Schrenk, Jr.

resigned while under investigation; evidence of disloyalty was found in only eight
cases. 51 '(IME 13 (March 1, 1948).
58 See the letter from members of the faculty of Yale Law School to the President
and the House of Representatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1947, p. 38:4. Dr. Henry Steele
Commager regards with apprehension the introduction of intellectual conformity as the
new concept of loyalty and attacks the effort to confine Americanism to a single pattern
as being itself a disloyalty to the American· tradition. Commager, "Who is Loyal to
America?" HARPER'S MAGAZINE 193 (Sept., 1947).
54 See the letter from Professors Griswold, Scott, Katz, and Chafee of the Harvard
Law School, appearing in the N.Y. TIMES, April 13, 1947, p. 8E:5.

